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Abstract
Recent empirical evidence links migrant remittances, savings and return migration, and
stresses the inaccuracy of return migration plans. This paper presents a model of
endogenous remittances, savings and return decisions under uncertainty. In our
framework, migrants make remittance and saving decisions at an early stage of
migration, when their long term economic performance in the host country is still
uncertain. Over time, information about professional prospects is acquired, and
conditionally on past decisions, migrants adjust their return plans. We show that when
migrants expect large gains from migration and face relatively low wage risks in the
host country, they tend to remit less, save more and are less likely to return migrate.
These results are in line with recent empirical evidence and provide a rationale for the
support by relatives in the sending country of low-skill, illegal migration.
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade, migrant remittances have become a key element of many develop-
ing economies. In 2012, remittances represented a quarter of the GDP’s of countries such
as Moldova, Lesotho and Nepal, and reaching even half of Tajikistan’s GDP.1 Remittances
are also important because their growth is both faster and more stable than official aid.
For instance, the average annual growth rate of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa has
amounted to 13.9% over the 1995–2010 period.2 These transfers help recipients in coun-
tries of origin to cope with adverse shocks, and foster investments in various domains,
such as education, productive assets and innovative technologies, but also in financial
development, housing and social capital.3
In the face of such a major phenomenon benefiting recipient countries, economists
have analyzed migrants’ behavior, and in particular their motivations to send remittances.
Migrant altruism towards the family left behind is among the most widely acknowledged
motives for remittances. Practically all other motives can be related to the existence of
some implicit contract between the migrant and the recipient. Such contracts involve
mutual insurance and various forms of investments made by migrants in the country of
origin, in human, physical, financial and social capital.
Although this literature is relatively vast, the analysis of the motives for remittances has
until recently overlooked important elements of the migrant’s decision process. While
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the link between remittances and return migration plans has recently been observed, the-
oretical analysis of the motives for remittances under endogenous return migration is
scarce. More importantly, empirical studies show strong discrepancies between planned
and actual duration of stay in the host country, due to uncertainty about their professional
prospects and about their capacity to assimilate in the host country. Yet, theoretical analy-
ses assume perfect foresight bymigrants. Finally, a proper analysis of migrants’ remittance
behavior should include alternative strategies of transferring resources to the future, such
as savings, whereas theoretical and empirical studies generally analyze either remittances
or savings, but not both. Addressing the following questions may therefore improve our
understanding of migrants’ remittance and return migration strategies. Are migrants
more or less likely to remit or to save under uncertainty? How do prior beliefs in terms
of expected gains and risks from migration affect migrants’ remittance-saving portfolio?
How do these decisions interact with labor market performance in the host country?
In this paper, we present a model of endogenous remittances, savings and return
decisions under uncertainty. Remittances foster investments in the host country, and
these investments also benefit the migrant.4 In our setting, migrants make remittance
and saving decisions at an early stage of migration, when both labor market perfor-
mance and return options are uncertain. Over time, when information about professional
prospects is acquired, and conditionally on past savings and remittances, migrants choose
to become either a permanent migrant or a return migrant by comparing the consump-
tion levels they would obtain in each location. It must be noted that this setting is in line
with long-term international migration rather than circular migration.5
Savings and remittances are two technologies to transfer resources to the future, but
they differ in some important aspects. When migrants consider whether to stay in the
host country or return, they view savings as completelymobile, in the sense that thesemay
be withdrawn and used in either location. In contrast, remittances lead to investments
which have location-specific returns. Indeed, a migrant eventually opting for a perma-
nent stay in the host country will only enjoy part (if any) of the remittance investment. For
instance, investments in physical capital (e.g. houses, small businesses, inheritance,. . . )
will incur transaction costs to be repatriated in the host country. Other types of invest-
ments in the origin country, for example in social capital (prestige, social status) are simply
immobile and illiquid and therefore sunk. These considerations have strong implications
in terms of return plans under uncertainty. For instance, we show that migrants who tend
to remit large amounts in the early stages of migration have, ceteris paribus, a higher
probability of return. Also, ex-ante, returns to remittances are random since they depend
on the uncertain final location. In other words, unlike savings, remittances affect the dis-
tribution of future consumption through (i) their different returns in each location and
(ii) their impact on return migration.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an original framework to analyze
migrants’ behavior. It allows us to relate profiles of migrants based on their beliefs in
terms of economic performance to various patterns of remittance-saving portfolios. More
specifically, we show that migrants forming high expectations about the benefits of migra-
tion tend to remit less to save more.6 Also migrants whose labor market outcomes are
relatively risky in the host country tend to remit more. Combining these prospect and risk
characteristics, the model predicts that low-skill, illegal migrants are likely remit, whereas
highly-educated and documented migrants are less likely to remit. Intermediate remitters
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are for instance legal migrants with low levels of education, and student migrants, whose
returns from migration are potentially high but risky. Also, the model reproduces a series
of recent stylized facts, linked to the determinants of remittance behavior, to the rela-
tionship between remittances and return intentions, and to the economic performance of
returnees.
First, all empirical analyses of remittance behavior highlight the existence of a large
share of non-remitting migrants. Bettin et al. (2012) develop an econometric model which
distinguishes various reasons for not remitting, either due to credit constrains, or due to
the mere non-willingness to remit. Our framework captures these different possibilities,
and explains why some unconstrained migrants may prefer not to remit. Since remit-
tances increase the likelihood of return migration ex ante, and remittances have a higher
return in the country of origin, returns to remittances are potentially convex. This con-
vexity is a source of corner solution in remittances. Also, migrants who ex ante have
high expectations about their economic outcomes in the host country are less likely to
return. Because of this, they are also more likely to bear transaction costs to repatriate
returns to remittances, which limits the attractiveness of such a form of investment. An
additional reason for not remitting is related to the location of risks in host and origin
countries. Migrants facing relatively low risk in the host country have no incentives to
remit, as remitting affects the probability of return, and as a result increases the exposure
to risks from the origin country. Conversely, this result is consistent with the observa-
tion that migrants facing high uncertainty in the host country are more likely to remit
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Sinning 2011).
The arguments on the impacts of expected gains and risks from migration provide a
rationale for the important flows of illegal migration and their support by family members
in developing countries. Indeed, our results imply that it is in the interest of migrants with
low/risky prospects to remit. Therefore, relatives financing the migration of this type of
agents are likely to receive transfers, independently of any pressure mechanisms.7 These
results are strongly related in our model to the positive effect of past remittances on the
likelihood of return. Dustmann and Mestres (2010) prove the existence of this “feedback
effect” in their thorough analysis of the impact of return plans on remittances. They show
that failing to take it into account leads to biased estimates of that impact.
Finally, the empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the economic performance
of return migrants. Our model provides rationales for this phenomenon, and may explain
cases of negative selection of return migrants. For instance, Coulon and Piracha (2005)
and Campos-Vazquez and Lara (2012) show that the average counterfactual wages of
return migrants had they never migrated are lower than the average wages of stayers,
despite the existence of a migration premium derived from the human capital accumu-
lated in the host country. In our model, there is first a potential negative selection at
the first stage of migration since, as explained above, migrants who have relatively low
and risky benefits from migration are the most likely to remit, and therefore are likely to
receive support. Second, because of transaction costs, the more migrants remit, the more
they are ready to concede low wages in the origin country. Furthermore, the low prospect,
high risk migrants are the most likely to remit and are therefore the most susceptible to
return and earn low wages.
In line with the explained empirical evidence, this model allows us to identify two dis-
tinct types of investment motives for remittances.8 First, when the expected returns to
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remittances are larger than the returns to savings, we say that remittances are sent with
a “pure investment motive”. Second, when the migrant’s risk structure across locations is
such that remittances reduce the total variance of future consumption, remittances may
be sent with a “precautionary investment motive”. Illegal migrants are particularly subject
to this second motive.
The paper is organized as follows. A review of the recent literature is provided in
Section 2. The general setting is introduced in Section 3. The case of risk neutral migrants
is presented in Section 4, while the case of risk averse migrants is analyzed in Section 5.
In Section 6, we provide an extension of the model allowing for differences in purchasing
power between the host country and the origin country. Concluding remarks are provided
in Section 7.
2 Review of the literature
This paper links three fields of the migration literature: the study of (i) the motives for
remittances, (ii) return migration plans, and (iii) the role of uncertainty at the early stages
of migration.
First, the literature analyzing the motives for remittances has been initiated by Lucas
and Stark (1985). Recent surveys of this question are provided by Rapoport and Docquier
(2006), Carling (2008) and Stark (2009). Remittances are generally motivated by altru-
ism towards the left behind and/or by the existence of an implicit contract between the
migrant and the recipient. This implicit contract can take various forms. Remittances may
be part of a mutual insurance arrangement. Indeed, migration allows families to diver-
sify their income sources (Stark and Levhari 1982) and remittances can be considered
as insurance transfers to the family left behind (Choi and Yang 2007; de la Briere et al.
2002; Gubert 2002). Remittances may also be seen as the repayment by the migrant of an
implicit loan whichmade the initial migration possible (Poirine 1997). As previously men-
tioned, remittances also foster investments in education (Edwards and Ureta 2003; Yang
2008, 2009; Calero et al. 2009 andAlcaraz et al. 2012), productive assets (Adams 1998) and
innovative production technologies (Mendola 2008), but also in financial development
(Aggarwal et al. 2011), housing (Adams Jr and Cuecuecha 2010; Osili 2004), social capital
(Gallego and Mendola 2013; Maggard 2004) and family prestige (Auriol and Demonsant
2012).
Whether altruism is involved or not in the migrant’s decision making process, these
investments generally benefit both remittance recipients and migrants themselves, either
in terms of physical or social capital. For instance, remittances maintain membership
rights in home communities (Osili 2007) and generate the gratitude from recipients (Stark
and Falk 1998). Remittances may also be sent to migrants’ extended family and friends
in order to ensure the provision of services, such as the maintenance of migrants’ patri-
mony, cattle and crops (Cox 1987). Finally, migrants may invest in their future inheritance
by sending money to their parents and improve their position against their siblings (the
so-called strategic bequest motive, observed by Hoddinott (1994), Schrieder and Knerr
(2000) and de la Briere et al. (2002)).
Second, return migration is an important phenomenon. For instance, about 40% of
migrants leave the host country after 5 to 7 years of migration (Bijwaard 2010) for
the Netherlands, Dustmann and Weiss (2007) for the UK). Return migration has first
been explained by location-specific preferences (Djajic and Milbourne 1988; Hill 1987).
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More recent contributions relate return migration to long term strategies (Borjas and
Bratsberg 1996), motivated either by “lifecycle” or “target earnings” considerations.
Migrants caring about lifecycle consumption determine the length of their stay abroad
by trading off higher (utility) costs of staying abroad, including differences in purchasing
powers, for higher earnings in the host country (Djajic and Milbourne 1988; Dustmann
1997, 2003; Stark et al. 1997). An increase in wages may lead “lifecycle migrants” to stay
longer in the host country. In contrast, migrants wishing to invest in their country of ori-
gin need to accumulate sufficient “target earnings” before returning (Djajic 2010;Mesnard
2004). These savings often translate into entrepreneurial activities, which require liq-
uidities and are more profitable if migrants acquired specific skills and human capital
in the host country (Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002; Dustmann et al. 2011). Compared
to lifecycle consumption, “target earnings” considerations provide opposite predictions:
higher wages in the host country allow migrants to reach the required level of savings
faster, allowing them to shorten their stay in the host country. Yang (2006) uses exchange
rate shocks to empirically test both theories and finds a larger support for the lifecycle
theory.
As regards remittances, recent empirical evidence highlights the positive link between
return intentions and remittances (Dustmann and Mestres 2010; William et al. 2011;
Sinning 2011) and between return intentions and asset holdings by migrants in the origin
country (Dustmann andMestres 2011). Yet to the best of our knowledge, our model is the
first to take into account this relation, and in particular the feedback effect of remittances
on return plans (Dustmann and Mestres 2010).
Third, with regard to uncertainty, most theories analyzing migration duration assume
that duration is decided at the beginning of the migration process, under perfect fore-
sight. There is however strong evidence that migrants form erroneous expectations about
available opportunities in the host country (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996) and about the
length of their stay, for instance in case of illegal migration and/or of poor economic
performance (Tunali 2000). van Baalen and Müller (2008) follow a sample of migrants
from Southern Europe and Turkey over 21 years using the German Socioeconomic Panel.
While a mere 2.7% declared their intention to stay more than 20 years in 1984, 39%
were still in Germany in 2004. These inaccurate expectations cannot only be attributed
to the initial phase of migration, as for each additional year in the host country, about
70% of immigrants revise upward the duration of their stay. At the same time, about 26%
of migrants who initially declared their plan to stay permanently in Germany had left
by 2004. Labour market trajectories affect return migration, as shown by Kirdar (2009)
and Bijwaard (2014) who both find that migrant unemployment has a positive impact
on return. In addition to return decisions, recent empirical studies show that uncer-
tainties about income and legal status also positively affect saving and/or remittance
behavior (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Piracha and Zhu 2012; Sinning 2011). Yet,
few theoretical works incorporate uncertainty. Galor and Stark (1991) assume that return
itself is random and exogenous and show that the return probability induces migrants
to save more than native-born individuals. Dustmann (1997) presents a model of sav-
ings and optimal duration under uncertainty. However, these decisions are jointly made
ex ante.
Our paper contributes to the three mentioned fields in the following ways. Among the
motives for remittances, we focus on the investment motive in various forms, including
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social capital (membership rights, gratitude, status). Interestingly, a self-interested behav-
ior involving investments of this kind mimics the predictions of the altruism motive
(Stark and Falk 1998), since both altruistic and self-interested migrants benefit more
from helping poorer recipients. Regarding the comparison between lifecycle and tar-
get earnings theories of return migration, our framework is more in line with lifecycle
considerations, since high wages in the host country lower the likelihood of return
migration. It is also worth noting that unlike many theoretical analyses previously cited,
our model does not require differences in purchasing power or in preferences for con-
sumption between host and home countries in order to motivate return migration.9
Instead, return migration is motivated here by the fact that for some migrants, remit-
tances may have a higher return than savings, or may decrease future risks. Because
of the feedback effect, remittances increase the willingness to return. In other words,
return migration in our framework is driven by the comparison between savings and
remittances and by the feedback effect. The results obtained in this case are qualita-
tively equivalent to the main setting. Finally, while the few studies which account for
uncertainty preclude any revision of return migration plans when information about the
migration outcome is revealed, our setting allows migrants to choose their final location
after the revelation of information. This feature is one of the main driving forces of our
results.
3 Themodel
Let us consider a migrant who lives for two periods, noted t ∈ {1, 2}. At the beginning
of period 1, the migrant has just arrived in the host country h and earns a certain ini-
tial wage w1 ≥ 0, but faces uncertainty about long term wage prospects, i.e. wages that
could be obtained by settling in the host country, or by returning to the origin country
o after a migration experience. Formally, at the beginning of period 1, the migrant only
knows the joint density function of period-2 wages in the origin and host countries, noted
k (wo,wh). Also, at this period, the migrant makes decisions on savings s and remittances
r. Consumption in period 1 is written:
c1 = w1 − r − s. (1)
Savings, which are placed on a bank account in the host country, produce τ s at the
beginning of period 2. Remittances are invested in the country of origin in some form
of (physical, financial, social) capital.10 This investment produces a return Rl (r) for the
migrant in period 2, which depends on the migrant’s location decision l ∈ {h, o}.11 Rl (r)
is location-specific because if migrants choose to stay in the host country, migrants only
partially benefit from investments made in the country of origin. The loss incurred in
case of permanent migration is either due to transaction costs borne to liquidate the asset
(e.g. a house, a small business,...), or simply because some specific types of assets, like
social capital, are immobile, illiquid and therefore sunk. As a result, Ro (r) ≥ Rh (r). Also,
let us define DR (r) ≡ Ro (r) − Rh (r) as the difference in returns to remittances between
temporary and permanent migration, or transaction costs, which increase with the value
of the investment: D′R (r) > 0.12
At the end of period 1, the migrant observes wo and wh. Based on this information,
the migrant decides at the beginning of period 2 whether to stay permanently in the host
country, or to return to the country of origin. In order to do so, the migrant compares
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consumption levels in both locations. Period-2 consumption levels if the migrant opts for
the origin / host countries are respectively:
co = wo + Ro (r) + τ s, (2)
ch = wh + Rh (r) + τ s. (3)
Note that contrary to remittances and wages, savings are perfectly mobile, since they
can be withdrawn and spent in any location.
Summing up, this setting highlights the trade-off between higher expected wages in the
host country and higher returns to remittances in the origin country in a context of uncer-
tainty. In the first period, the migrant decides on savings and remittances (s, r). In the
second period, wages in both locations (wo, wh) are observed by the migrant, who chooses
a location l ∈ {h, o}. Solving backwards, we start by analyzing the second period’s prob-
lem, namely the location choice, and derive its consequences on the (ex ante) likelihood
of return migration in period 1 and on saving and remittance decisions.
3.1 Optimal location choice
The migrant chooses the location in which the consumption level is the highest, so that
ex-post, period-2 consumption c2 = max {co, ch}. In this simple setting, this choice boils
down to comparing the difference in returns to remittances between origin and host
countries, DR (r) ≡ Ro (r) − Rh (r), to the difference in wages between host and origin
countries,Dw ≡ wh−wo.13 At this stage, note thatDR (r) is certain and depends on a past
endogenous variable, whereas Dw is a random variate.
Lemma 1. In period 2, the migrant returns to the origin country if Dw < DR.
The condition for return migration simply comes from the comparison between co
and ch:
co > ch ⇐⇒ wh − wo ≡ Dw < DR ≡ Ro − Rh.
Having determined the optimal location condition, we can now start the analysis of the
migrant’s problem in period 1. In this period, wages, and consequently the wage gap Dw,
are treated as random variables. Return migration is therefore uncertain, and depends
on the distribution of Dw. Let f (Dw) denote the marginal density of Dw, where f (Dw) =∫ ∫
k (wo,wh) ι (wh,wo,Dw) dwodwh, where ι (wh,wo,Dw) = 1 if wh − wo = Dw and ι = 0
otherwise. The cumulative density function of Dw is noted F (Dw).
Lemma 2. In period 1, the probability of return migration, Pr (Dw ≤ DR) = F (DR),
increases with remittances:
∂F (DR)
∂r = f (DR)D
′
R (r) > 0.
This Lemma provides microfoundations of the “feedback effect” of remittances on
return plans (Dustmann and Mestres 2010).14 In the next two sections, we will solve
the migrant’s problem in period 1, i.e. defining optimal remittances and savings under
uncertainty, anticipating optimal location decisions in period 2. Since remittances have
different returns depending on the location choice, but also affect the probability of
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return migration, they have complex effects on the distribution of consumption patterns
in period 2. These effects pertain to expected consumption on the one hand, and risk on
the other hand. For the sake of expositional simplicity, we will separate the cases of risk
neutrality and risk aversion in two distinct sections. In order to do so, recall first that the
migrant’s preferences have two relevant aspects, namely risk aversion and consumption
smoothing over time, which standard expected utility does not allow to disentangle.15
In contrast, the more general non-expected utility theory developed by Selden (1978)
and Kreps and Porteus (1978) separates risk aversion and consumption smoothing.16
Following this approach, the migrant’s utility is noted
U = u (c1) + δu
(
g−1E
(
g (c2)
))
, (4)
where both u (·) and g (·) are increasing, concave functions. g−1E (g (c2)) = c˜2 is the
certainty equivalent functional of period-2 consumption, with
E
[
g (c2)
] = F (DR)E(g (co) |Dw ≤ DR) + (1 − F (DR))E(g (ch) |Dw > DR), (5)
where with probability F (DR) the migrant returns to the country of origin and enjoys
E(g (co) |Dw ≤ DR), where co depends on the realization of wo. With probability
(1 − F (DR)), the migrant stays in the host country and enjoys E(g (ch) |Dw > DR). While
the concavity of u(·) captures the migrant’s taste for consumption smoothing, the concav-
ity of g(·) captures the degree of risk aversion. Section 4 and 5 are based on two particular
cases of Kreps-Porteus preferences. Section 4 covers the case of risk-neutral migrants hav-
ing a taste for consumption smoothing, which corresponds to a linear g(·) function and a
concave u (·) function. This case allows us to introduce the “pure investment motive” for
remittances, which appears when the expected return to remittances dominates that of
savings. In Section 5, we introduce risk aversion by posing that u (·) and g (·) are identical.
This second case, which corresponds to expected utility, puts forward the “precaution-
ary motive” for remittances: depending on the distribution of wage risks across locations,
remittances may decrease the variance of future consumption.
4 Risk neutral migrant and the pure investment motive
Following equation (4) and using a linear g(·) function, the risk-neutral migrant’s utility is:
U = u (c1) + δu (E [c2]) ,
where c1 is defined in (1) and c2 is equal to co (2) if Dw < DR, and is equal to ch (3) oth-
erwise. Since Dw is by definition equal to wh − wo, it belongs to the same data generating
process. Therefore, for a given pair (wo,wh) and its corresponding wage gap Dw, the fol-
lowing joint densities have the same values: k (wo,wh) = m (wo,Dw) = n (wh,Dw), where
m (wo,Dw) and n (wh,Dw) are joint densities of wages with Dw.17 Using these notations,
we can write the expectation of period-2 consumption by distinguishing the two final
possible locations:
E [c2]=
DR∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
(τ s+Ro+wo)m(wo,Dw)dwodDw+
+∞∫
DR
+∞∫
−∞
(τ s+Rh+wh) n(wh,Dw)dwhdDw.
(6)
Delpierre and Verheyden IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:22 Page 9 of 43
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/22
Let us first analyze the properties of the remittance technology in the way it affects the
expectation of future consumption. Based on these properties, we will study in a second
subsection the optimal remittances decision of risk-neutral migrants.
4.1 The impact of remittances on expected consumption
In this subsection, we will analyze the impact of remittances on (i) the expected consump-
tion in each location, and (ii) the total expectation of consumption, taking into account
optimal location decisions.
The first analysis will provide interesting results about the economic performance of
return migrants and of permanent migrants. In order to study the expected consumption
in each location conditional, let us rewrite (6) as:
E [c2] = F (DR)E(co|Dw ≤ DR) + (1 − F (DR))E(ch|Dw > DR), (7)
where conditional expectations of consumption in case of return and permanent migra-
tion are respectively:
E (co|Dw ≤ DR) = τ s + Ro + E (wo|Dw ≤ DR) ,
E (ch|Dw > DR) = τ s + Rh + E (wh|Dw > DR) ,
and conditional expectations of wages are:
E (wo|Dw ≤ DR) =
DR∫
−∞
⎛⎝+∞∫
−∞
wom(wo|Dw)dwo
⎞⎠ f (Dw)
F (DR)
dDw,
E (wh|Dw > DR) =
+∞∫
DR
⎛⎝+∞∫
−∞
whm(nh|Dw)dwh
⎞⎠ f (Dw)
1 − F (DR)dDw.
This decomposition allows us to assess the impact of remittances on the expected con-
sumption in each location separately, taking into account the endogeneity of the location
decision. Such an exercise brings two interesting findings. First, it allows us to provide an
explanation to the poor performance of some return migrants.18 Second, it shows that
remittances, although they are more productive in case of return migration, increase the
conditional expectation of consumption of migrants settling in the host country.
Proposition 1. Conditionally on optimal location decisions in period 2,
1. remittances decrease the expected wage E(wo|Dw ≤ DR), but have an ambiguous
impact on the expected consumption in the country of origin:
∂E(co|Dw ≤ DR)
∂r = R
′
o (r) +
∂E(wo|Dw ≤ DR)
∂r ,
where R′o (r) ≥ 0 but ∂E(wo|Dw≤DR)∂r < 0.
2. remittances have a positive impact on the expected wage and consumption in the
host country:
∂E(ch|Dw > DR)
∂r = R
′
h (r) +
∂E(wh|Dw > DR)
∂r > 0,
where R′h (r) > 0 and
∂E(wh|Dw>DR)
∂r > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
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Remittances have an ambiguous impact on E(co|Dw ≤ DR) because, ceteris paribus,
migrants who remit more are ready to concede lower wages in the origin country. Indeed,
as r increases, so does DR, so that the condition to return (Dw ≤ DR) is easier to satisfy.
In other words, return migration is compatible with higher values of Dw, that is, lower
(higher) values of wo (wh). This result provides a rationale for poor economic outcomes
of return migrants: the more migrants remit, the more likely they will return, and the
lower the wages they are ready to accept in case of return. Conversely, remittances have
a positive impact on E(wh|Dw > DR): migrants who remit are less likely to stay, which
implies that they will do so only for sufficiently large wages in the host country.
Having analyzed the impact of remittances by location, let us now analyze their global
impact on E [c2]. To this end, let us rewrite (6) as:
E [c2] = τ s + E [R] + E [w] , (8)
where:
E [w] ≡ F (DR)E (wo|Dw ≤ DR) + (1 − F (DR))E (wh|Dw > DR) , (9)
E [R] ≡ F(DR)Ro + (1 − F(DR))Rh. (10)
E [w] is the expected wage, based on the distributions of wages in each location condi-
tional on the wage gapDw. Similarly, E [R] is the total expectation of return to remittances,
which also depends on ex-post location decisions. In order to show the impact of remit-
tances on E [c2], let us first analyze their impacts on E [w] and E [R] separately. The next
Lemma shows that migrants who decide to remit anticipate lower expected wages, but
higher expected benefits from remittances.
Lemma 3. Remittances have a negative impact on E [w] and a positive impact on E [R]:
∂E [w]
∂r = −f (DR)D
′
RDR < 0,
∂E [R]
∂r = f (DR)D
′
RDR + E
[
R′ (r)
]
> 0,
where
E
[
R′ (r)
] ≡ F(DR)R′o (r) + (1 − F(DR))R′h (r) > 0. (11)
The first part of the lemma, which states that remittances have a negative impact on
expected wages, is explained by the following intuition. Remitting increases the likelihood
of return migration by f (DR)D′R. The global distribution of wages is unaffected by this
change, except at the margin where migrants are indifferent between returning and stay-
ing, i.e. when Dw = DR. When switching from staying to returning, they renege on wh to
earn a wage wo instead. Therefore, they suffer a loss Dw at this marginal point, which is
precisely equal to DR.
The second part of the lemma highlights two positive effects of r on E [R]. The first
effect stems from the fact that, as for E [w], remittances increase the likelihood of
return migration at the margin. At this margin, migrants enjoy a return Ro (r) instead of
Rh (r): they benefit from a marginal increase equal to DR. The second and most obvi-
ous term accounts for the marginal returns to remittances in each location, R′o (r) and
R′h (r). Weighting these two marginal returns by their respective probabilities leads to
E
[
R′ (r)
]
.
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Proposition 2. The total expectation of future consumption is increasing, and poten-
tially convex in remittances.
∂E [c2]
∂r =
∂E [R]
∂r +
∂E [w]
∂r = E
[
R′ (r)
]
> 0,
∂2E [c2]
∂r2 = f (DR)
(
D′R (r)
)2 + E [R′′ (r)] , (12)
where
E
[
R′′ (r)
] = F(DR)R′′o (r) + (1 − F(DR))R′′h (r) .
Combining the two parts of Lemma 3 leads directly to Proposition 2. This proposition
shows first that remittances affect E [c2] through an increase in returns to remittances,
but also a decrease in the expected wage, since remittances increase the likelihood
of migrating back to the country of origin, where wages are on average lower. How-
ever, the net marginal effect of remittances on expected consumption is always positive,
and corresponds to the expected marginal return to remittances, E
[
R′ (r)
]
. Figure 1
illustrates these effects. In this figure, when remittances are close to zero, the proba-
bility of return migration is zero, so that E [R (r)] = Rh (r), and E [w] = E [wh].19 As
remittances increase, the likelihood of return migration becomes strictly positive, and
E [R (r)] increases, as it becomes a convex combination of Rh (r) and Ro (r). Also, E [w]
decreases, as it depends on the distribution of both wh and wo. As stated in the previ-
ous proposition, the sum of these two effects is always positive (the blue curve is always
increasing in r). As remittances increase further, they become so large that the proba-
bility of returning to the origin country becomes equal to 1. In that case, E [R (r)] =
Ro (r), and E [w] = E [wo]. Further increases in remittances no longer affect expected
wages, while returns to remittances are perceived with certainty in the country of
origin.
Secondly, the proposition shows that expected consumption is not only increasing, but
may also be convex in r. This potential convexity comes from the first term in the right
hand side of (12), which is positive and is due to the feedback effect of remittances.
Indeed, even if Ro (r) and Rh (r) are not convex, expected consumption may be more
and more increasing in remittances because the more the migrant remits, the higher
the probability of returning to the origin country, where the benefits of remittances
are the highest. In other words, as the migrant remits, E [R (r)] puts more weight on
Ro (r), and less on Rh (r). In Figure 2, we present a case where Ro (r) and Rh (r) are both
linear, so that, following the previous reasoning, returns to remittances are always con-
vex: ∂2E[c2]
∂r2 = f (DR)
(
D′R (r)
)2 ≥ 0. Figure 2 illustrates that as long as remittances increase
the likelihood of return migration, E [c2] is always convex in remittances when Ro (r) and
Ro (r) are linear.
This possible variety in the “technology” of returns to remittances gives rise to the
following questions: (i) whichmigrant characteristics are likely to lead to high/low or con-
cave/convex returns to remittances, and (ii) how does this affect the migrant’s optimal
remittances behavior? We address the first question in the next subsection, looking at the
impact of migrants’ beliefs about their wage prospects.
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Figure 1 The remittance technology.
4.2 Howmigrant characteristics affect the impact of r on E [c2]
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of migrants’ and recipients’ characteristics on
the shape of returns to remittances, both through ∂E[c2]
∂r and
∂2E[c2]
∂r2 . While we provide
here analytical results and their interpretation, the interested reader can find graphical
representations of these results based on calibrations of the model in Appendix 2.
First, we show that the higher the migrants’ anticipations about their labor market per-
formance in the host country, the lower their expected marginal returns to remittances.
In order to show this, let us consider that some migrants have higher wage prospects
from migration than others following the concept of first order stochastic dominance. A
migrant with high (low) wage prospects faces a cumulative distribution of the wage gap
between host and origin countries noted FPh(Dw) (FPl (Dw)). The distribution of the wage
gap for migrants with high prospects first-order stochastically dominates that of migrant
Figure 2 The remittance technology (convex case).
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with low wage prospects: FPh(Dw) ≤ FPl (Dw) for all Dw. In other words, for any given Dw,
the higher the migrant’s wage prospects, the lower F(Dw). Note that first order stochastic
dominance implies that migrants with higher prospects have a higher expected wage gap:
EPh(Dw) ≥ EPl (Dw).
Lemma 4. For all r, the higher the migrant’s wage prospects, the lower ∂E[c2]
∂r .
Proof. One can rewrite ∂E[c2]
∂r = E
[
R′ (r)
]
as F(DR (r))D′R + R′h (r), which clearly
increases with F(DR (r)). For a given level of DR, a migrant with higher migration
prospects faces a lower expected marginal return to remittances. See Appendix 2 for a
graphical illustration.
Let us now discuss how recipient characteristics affect ∂2E[c2]
∂r2 . We have seen that
∂2E[c2]
∂r2
is the sum of two terms, f (DR)
(
D′R (r)
)2 and E [R′′ (r)]. While the first is always posi-
tive, the second term may also be positive, depending on the way recipients in the origin
country use remittances. Indeed, E
[
R′′ (r)
]
is more likely to be positive in poor receiving
households than in rich ones. Intuitively, poor families are likely to first allocate remit-
tances to their basic needs. Themore themigrant remits, the higher recipients’ capacity to
switch tomore productive investments, which also benefits themigrant. Marginal returns
to remittances are therefore negligible for low levels of remittances, and become attrac-
tive as recipient households have improved their living conditions. As a result, migrants
originating from poor households are more likely to face convex returns to remittances.
This reasoning has been illustrated by Adams (1998), which shows that households with
a migrant member have a higher marginal propensity to invest.
In the next section, we analyze migrants’ optimal saving and remittance decisions,
taking into account the potential heterogeneity in the remittance technology across
migrants.
4.3 Optimal savings and remittances under risk neutrality
The risk-neutral migrant’s objective is:
Max{s,r} U = u (c1) + δu (E [c2]) ,
where c1 and E [c2] are defined in (1) and (8), and both r and s need to satisfy non-
negativity constraints. While remittances can obviously not be negative, borrowing is
precluded by the migrant’s lack of credibility to repay a loan in case of return migration.
As mentioned in Proposition 2, returns to remittances may either be concave, or convex.
Let us analyze these two cases separately.
Proposition 3. Under risk neutrality, if ∂2E[c2]
∂r2 ≤ 0, then three types of remittance-saving
portfolios are possible: (0, s∗), (r∗, s∗) and (r∗, 0), where:
• under “high” migration prospects (large E [Dw]): (0, s∗) such that
u′1
δu′2
= τ > E [R′ (0)],
• under “intermediate” migration prospects: (r∗, s∗) such that u′1
δu′2
= τ = E [R′ (r)],
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• under “low” migration prospects (small E [Dw]): (r∗, 0) such that
u′1
δu′2
= E [R′ (r∗)] > τ .
The migrant’s optimal strategy of saving/remittance portfolio is determined by the
Kuhn Tucker conditions with respect to savings and remittances, which are respectively:
Us = −u′1 + δu′2τ = 0 and s > 0,
= −u′1 + δu′2τ < 0 and s = 0,
(13)
and
Ur = −u ′1 + δu′2E
[
R′ (r)
] = 0 and r > 0, (14)
= −u ′1 + δu′2E
[
R′ (r)
]
< 0 and r = 0. (15)
If both first order conditions are satisfied with equality, that is, if there is an interior
solution in both r and s, we obtain the following arbitrage condition:
E
[
R′ (r)
] = τ . (16)
The marginal returns to both activities must equalize at this double interior solution.
However, depending on the migrant’s wage prospects, one of these two first order condi-
tions may not hold with equality, leading to a corner solution in either r or s. Following
Lemma 4, if prospects are so high that E
[
R′ (0)
]
< τ , marginal returns to remittances
are too low for the migrant to send remittances ; instead he/she will focus on savings. In
contrast, if prospects are low, the optimal level of remittances may still have a marginal
return which dominates that of savings: E
[
R′ (r∗)
]
> τ . In this case, the migrant has no
incentives to save and will only remit. These three cases are illustrated in Figure 3.
It must be noted that the solutions described here are valid if and only if ∂2E[c2]
∂r2 < 0.
Intuitively, for the arbitrage condition, E
[
R′ (r)
] = τ , to hold at equilibrium, remittances
should have a decreasing expected marginal return. Indeed, remittances below the inte-
rior solution should have a higher marginal return than savings, while remittances beyond
Figure 3 Optimal savings and remittances under concave returns to remittances.
Delpierre and Verheyden IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:22 Page 15 of 43
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/22
the interior solution should have a lower return than savings. If, as mentioned in the pre-
vious section, remittances have an increasing marginal return, this reasoning does not
hold, and a corner solution will prevail. As shown in the next proposition, the case of
convex returns to remittances is incompatible with an interior solution in both s and r.
Proposition 4. If ∂2E[c2]
∂r2 > 0, then the optimal remittance/saving portfolio of the
migrant is never diversified. Two remittance-savings portfolios are possible, (0, s∗) and
(r∗, 0), where:
• under “high” migration prospects: (0, s∗) with U (0, s∗) > U (r∗, 0) and s∗ such that
u′1
δu′2
= τ ,
• under “low” migration prospects: (r∗, 0) with U (r∗, 0) > U (0, s∗), and r∗ such that
u′1
δu′2
= E [R′ (r∗)].
Proof. See Appendix 3.
The main insight of this case is that the optimal remittance/saving portfolio of the
migrant is never diversified when returns to remittances are convex. Which of the two
assets is chosen depends again on return prospects. If prospects are high (low), marginal
returns to remittances are low and the migrant saves (remits).
Figure 4 illustrates why an interior solution in both s and r is impossible under con-
vex returns to remittances. On the left graph, for low values of r, marginal returns to
remittances are too low compared to returns to savings, τ . Remitting large amounts in
order to enjoy high marginal returns to remittances would distort the migrant’s consump-
tion path excessively (insufficient consumption in period 1) compared to the balance
offered by savings (point S). The graph in the middle represents the limit case in which
the migrant is indifferent between only saving (point S) and only remitting (U (r∗, 0) =
U (0, s∗)). In this case, due to the convexity of returns to remittances, the migrant needs
to remit a larger amount than what he/she would have saved (r∗ > s∗) in order to reach
Figure 4 Optimal savings and remittances under convex returns to remittances.
Delpierre and Verheyden IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:22 Page 16 of 43
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/22
the attractive portion of returns to remittances.20 Finally, the last graph illustrates the
case in which returns to remittances are large and/or very convex. Since marginal returns
to remittances become quickly high, and the migrant only remits. Here, the migrant may
consume more in period 1 than he/she would have with savings.
Let us now analyze the risk implications of remittances.
5 Risk aversemigrants and the precautionary investment motive
In this section, we generalize migrants’ preferences by introducing risk aversion, while
maintaining the rest of the model unchanged. As previously mentioned, the migrant’s
utility function in this section is based on expected utility:
U = u (c1) + δEu (c2) , (17)
where c1 is defined in (1) and c2 is equal to co if DR > Dw, and is equal to ch otherwise,
where co and ch are defined respectively in (2) and (3). In this analysis, we will make use
of the standard concepts of certainty equivalent and Arrow-Pratt approximation of the
risk premium. Let c˜2 denote the certainty equivalent of c2, that is, u (c˜2) = Eu (c2). This
certainty equivalent can be approximated by
c˜2 ≈ E (c2) − η2Var(c2), (18)
where η is the migrant’s degree of absolute risk aversion. Based on this formula, and since
we already studied the effect of remittances on E (c2), we will focus in this section on the
variance of c2. One can show, as an application of the law of total variance, that Var(c2)
takes the following form:
Var(c2) = E [Var (c2|Dw)] + Var [E (c2|Dw)] ,
where
E [Var (c2|Dw)] = F (DR)Var (wo|Dw ≤ DR)+(1 − F (DR))Var (wh|Dw > DR) , (19)
and
Var [E (c2|Dw)] = F (DR) (1 − F(DR)) [E (co|Dw ≤ DR) − E (ch|Dw > DR)]2
= F (DR) (1 − F(DR)) [DR + E (wo|Dw ≤ DR) − E (wh|Dw > DR)]2 .
(20)
Let us describe intuitively the two terms composing the variance of c2. The first term,
E [Var (c2|Dw)], which is decomposed in (19), represents the average variance over the
two locations. More precisely, it is the weighted sum of consumption variances by loca-
tion, where weights are the probabilities of choosing these respective locations. The
second term, Var [E (c2|Dw)], which is decomposed in (20), represents the consumption
variance which is due to differences in expected consumption across locations. This sec-
ond term can be interpreted as the risk imposed by the uncertainty about the future
location itself.
In the next subsection, we assess the impact of remittances on the aggregate risk faced
by the migrant.
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5.1 The impact of remittances on consumption variance
In this section, we will provide a rationale, based on risk considerations, to the fact
that migrants facing relatively more risks in the host country, such as illegal migrants,
are more likely to remit than others. Indeed, the initial distribution of uncertainty is
an important determinant of the migrant’s ability to use remittances as a precautionary
investment. More precisely, we show that if the wage uncertainty is mostly located in
the host country labor market, remittances have the property of reducing future con-
sumption variance. This argument also provides a rationale for the fact that in developing
countries, families provide support for illegal/risky migration. Indeed, it is in the own
interest of migrants facing high risk in the host country to send remittances, so that
families are likely to receive a return on investment independently of pressure mecha-
nisms, such as migrant networks. This section also allows us to show that the location
choice (temporary versus permanent migration) is per se a risk-coping mechanism, used
ex post. Remittances, sent ex ante, improve the effectiveness of this ex-post risk-coping
device.
The impact of remittances on aggregate risk is highlighted in the following Lemma. The
economic intuition follows in the subsequent propositions.
Lemma 5. The derivative of the total consumption variance is determined by
∂Var(c2)
∂r = 2D
′
RF (DR) (1 − F (DR)) [E(co|Dw ≤ DR) − E(ch|Dw > DR)]
+ f (DR)D′R [Var (wo|DR) − Var (wh|DR)] .
(21)
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Lemma 5 describes the effect of remittances on the variance of the migrant’s future
consumption. The sign of this effect depends on two terms. First, remittances are likely
to decrease Var(c2) if the expected consumption is lower in the origin country than in
the host country (E(co|Dw ≤ DR) < E(ch|Dw > DR)). Note that these expectations are
conditional on the wage gap, and that the distribution of wages across the two locations
is in fact a crucial determinant of the sign of this first term. Second, remittances are likely
to decrease Var(c2) if, at the margin where the migrant is indifferent between staying and
returning (i.e. for Dw = DR), the variance of wages in the origin country is lower than the
variance of wages in the host country.
In order to provide more insights from this general formula and to highlight the role
played by the distribution of wage risks across locations, we need to add more struc-
ture on the distribution of wages. To this end, we will assume that wages are drawn
from a bivariate normal distribution, with means E [wo] = μo and E [wh] = μh and
variances Var [wo] = σ 2o and Var [wh] = σ 2h . We assume without loss of generality
that wages are independently distributed across locations, so that cov (wo,wh) = 0.21
The reason why we assume a bivariate normal distribution is that this distribution
has appealing properties allowing analytical solutions and providing intuitive results.
One implication of normality is that the migrant’s income variance is minimized for
E(co|Dw ≤ DR) = E(ch|Dw > DR). This is intuitive since, at this point, uncer-
tainty related to the location itself vanishes, given that ex ante the consumption levels
are equal in both locations. It has to be noted, however, that if this level is optimal
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from an insurance perspective (precautionary motive), remittances are also potentially
sent to increase the migrant’s expected income (pure investment motive). This com-
bination of motives is explored in the section devoted to the migrant’s optimization
problem.
5.2 Howmigrant characteristics affect the impact of r on Var (c2)
As in the previous section, let us consider how some migrant characteristic may affect
the remittance technology, in term of consumption variance this time. Let us define the
relative variance of wages in the host country as
θh ≡
σ 2h
σ 2o + σ 2h
∈ [0, 1] .
Clearly, migrants differ in terms of θh. For instance, illegal migrants are more likely to
face risk in the host country, in which case θh is close to one. On the other hand, well
established and integrated migrants should face very little risk in the host country, while
uncertainty in case of return is higher.
Proposition 5. Remittances are risk-reducing if the relative host-country wage variance
θh is sufficiently large:
∂Var(c2)
∂r < 0 ⇐⇒ θh > θ˜h, (22)
where the threshold θ˜h depends on DR (r):
θ˜h ≡ DR − E(Dw|Dw ≤ DR)E(Dw|Dw > DR) − E(Dw|Dw ≤ DR)) ∈ [0, 1] .
Proof. See Appendix 5.
Proposition 5 indicates that remittances decrease the aggregate income risk faced by
the migrant if her initial risk is mainly located in the host country (large θh). Intuitively,
increasing remittances makes return migration more likely, which reduces the exposure
to the relatively large risk in the host country. An important implication of Proposition 5
is that θ˜h is itself a function of the level of remittances. The next proposition states that
the impact of remittances on risk is non-monotonic.
Proposition 6. θ˜h is increasing in r. Therefore, Var(c2) is potentially non-monotonic in
r, being decreasing for low r, and increasing for large r.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
This proposition states that low levels of remittances may decrease aggregate risk, as in
this case θ˜h is low and is likely to be smaller than θh. Large levels of remittances may on
the other hand be risk-increasing, as θ˜h is then high and will eventually be larger than θh.
It must be noted at this stage that the impact of remittances on aggregate risk is largely
driven by the fact that our framework accounts for the location choice. More precisely,
it can be argued that in this setting, the genuine self insurance device is the migrant’s
ability to choose her location after information about wages is revealed. Indeed, for any
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initial geographical distribution of risks, the migrant is protected against low wages by
the ability to select the best outcome among both locations. In other words, the migrant
is capable of mitigating a negative shock in one location by moving to the other location.
Moreover, as we show in the following example, this instrument is most powerful if risk
is evenly distributed among locations. Example 1 provides the intuition behind proposi-
tions 5 and 6, namely that remittances are risk-reducing if risk is mainly located in the host
economy and that transferring too much risk towards the origin country might, at the
end, increase the aggregate risk faced by the migrant. In order to illustrate these points,
we use a simplified framework where the only decision variable is location.
Example 1. Suppose an agent can choose between two locations {a, b}, where wages are
random and take the following form:
wa = w − (1 − θh) x,
wb = w + θhx,
where x ∼ F (x) and E (x) = 0. Let ω ≡ Max {wa,wb} define the wage the agent will obtain
in period two after selection of the optimal location. Two results emerge from this example.
1. The capacity to choose the best location always improves the expected
consumption: the expected consumption conditional on optimal location, E (ω), is
larger than the unconditional expected consumption w.
2. The consumption variance conditional on optimal location, Var (ω) is minimized
when the initial income risk is identical in both locations, i.e. for θh = 1/2.
Proof. See Appendix 7.
As this simplified example illustrates, on the one hand, the location choice allows the
migrant to increase expected consumption. On the other hand, it shows that aggregate
risk depends on the initial risk composition. More precisely, the more the distribution
of wage risks across locations is even ex ante, the lower the variance of consumption
conditional on optimal location. If risk is mainly located in the host economy, remittances
can be used to improve the balance of risks across locations, so that aggregate risk is
reduced. This mechanism provides an explanation to the empirical evidence according to
which migrants facing higher risks in the host country are more likely to remit (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2006). On the contrary, as stated in Proposition 6, remittances may
increase aggregate risk if the origin country is relatively riskier.
5.3 Optimal savings and remittances under risk aversion
Themigrant maximizes expected utility with respect to savings and remittances. The first
order conditions are given by
Us = −u′1 + δu′2τ ≤ 0, (23)
Ur = −u′1 + δu′2
∂ c˜2
∂r ≤ 0, (24)
where c˜2 is defined in equation (18), so that under constant absolute risk aversion,
∂ c˜2
∂r ≈
∂E(c2)
∂r −
η
2
∂Var (c2)
∂r ,
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where ∂E(c2)
∂r = E
[
R′ (r)
]
, as described in Proposition 2, and where the impact on the
variance is given by equation (21). We are now able to formally take into account both
precautionary and pure investment motives. Under risk neutrality, we have shown that
returns to remittances are potentially convex, as discussed after equation (12). In the risk
averse case, we need to also take into account the effect of remittances on consumption
variance in order to define the concavity or convexity of total returns to remittances. Note
that another source of migrant heterogeneity, namely risk aversion η, amplifies this result:
the larger η, the larger the impact of r on Var (c2).
Definition 1. Under risk aversion, total returns to remittances are concave if
∂ 2˜c2
∂r2 ≈
∂2E (c2)
∂r2 −
η
2
∂2Var (c2)
∂r2 ≤ 0. (25)
Whether returns to remittances are convex or concave matters for the optimal migrant
portfolio. Indeed, as in the section with risk neutrality, we know that the migrant’s objec-
tive may admit an interior maximum in both s and r only if total returns to remittances
are concave. Although convex total returns to remittances are still possible for risk averse
migrants, this possibility is less likely than in the case of risk neutral migrants. The fact
that concavity is more relevant under risk aversion than under risk neutrality is due to
the impact of remittances on the variance of consumption. By Proposition 6, we know
that ∂2Var(c2)
∂r2 > 0. This effect, whose magnitude increases with the degree of absolute
risk aversion η, increases the likelihood of concave returns to remittances. As a result,
it is likely that risk averse migrants choose strictly positive levels of both savings and
remittances. However, one should keep in mind that, even if returns to remittances are
concave, the non-negativity constraint on savings may, under some conditions, be bind-
ing. As in Proposition 3, this will be the case if the return to savings is low compared to the
returns to remittances, which, in the risk averse case, combine potential benefits in terms
of both expectation and variance of consumption. For instance, because remittances are
risk-reducing for illegal migrants, these migrants are more likely to have no savings, other
things being equal.
Proposition 7. Optimal savings and remittances under risk aversion
1. If ∂ 2˜c2
∂r2 ≤ 0, then depending on migration prospects and host-country relative risk
θh, three types of remittance-saving portfolios are possible:
• “high” and “safe” migration prospects (large E [Dw], low θh): (0, s∗) such that
u′1
δu′2
= τ > ∂ c˜2
∂r |(r=0),
• “intermediate” migration prospects: (r∗, s∗) such that u′1
δu′2
= τ = ∂ c˜2
∂r |r∗ ,
• “low” and “risky” migration prospects (low E [Dw], large θh): (r∗, 0) such that
u′1
δu′2
= ∂ c˜2
∂r |r∗ > τ .
2. If ∂ 2˜c2
∂r2 > 0, then the optimal remittance/saving portfolio is never diversified:
• “high” and “safe” migration prospects: (0, s∗) with U (0, s∗) > U (r∗, 0) and s∗
such that u
′
1
δu′2
= τ ,
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• “low” and “risky” migration prospects: (r∗, 0) with U (r∗, 0) > U (0, s∗) and r∗
such that u
′
1
δu′2
= ∂ c˜2
∂r |r∗ .
The last section provides a taxonomy of the motives for remittances, based on the
analysis conducted above.
5.4 Remittances as pure and/or precautionary investment?
Figure 5 provides a taxonomy of investment motives for remittances. This taxonomy
is based on the way remittances affect the expectation and variance of consumption at
the margin, and is therefore represented in the space
(
∂Var(c2)
∂r ;
∂E(c2)
∂r
)
. Combining the
first order conditions presented in equations (23) and (24), we know that, for an interior
solution,
τ = ∂ c˜2
∂r ≈
∂E(c2)
∂r −
η
2
∂Var (c2)
∂r .
This equation is represented in Figure 5 by the straight line with positive slope η2 . All
points below this line are such that ∂ c˜2
∂r < τ , in which cases it is not in the migrant’s
interest to remit. For this reason, r∗ is at a corner in the grey area in the lower right corner
of the graph.
In the upper left part of the figure, remittances are attractive because ∂ c˜2
∂r ≥ τ . If
∂E(c2)
∂r < τ , the investment motive is irrelevant since savings provide a better return.
However, the fact that ∂ c˜2
∂r > τ is due to the fact that remittances are risk-reducing
at the margin. Therefore, remittances are spent on a precautionary motive in this case,
which is represented by the yellow triangle. The opposite case is captured by the orange
triangle, in which only the investment motive is relevant, since ∂E(c2)
∂r > τ whereas remit-
tances increase risk: ∂Var(c2)
∂r > 0. Finally, the white square represents the area where both
motives are met since remittances have a higher average return than savings and decrease
the aggregate risk.
Figure 5 Taxonomy of the investment motives for remittances.
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6 Extension: differences in purchasing power across locations
In this section, we add differences in purchasing power between the host and origin coun-
tries by means of different prices. We denote the prices of the numeraire good in the host
and origin countries by ph and po, with ph ≥ po: one monetary unit allows the migrant to
consume more in the country of origin than in the host country. Consumption levels in
period 1 are adapted from the basic model in the following way:
c1 = w1 − r − sph ,
while period-2 consumption levels if the migrant opts for the origin / host countries are
respectively:
co = wo + Ro (r) + τ spo ,
ch = wh + Rh (r) + τ sph .
Note that this setting is equivalent to the basic model when po = ph. The migrant
chooses the location in which the consumption level is the highest, which now also
depends on prices. While this price difference reinforces the benefits of remittances
in the country of origin, it also has important implications on the returns to savings.
Indeed, accumulated savings allow the migrant to consume more in the country of ori-
gin, and therefore create an additional incentive to return migrate. To see this, note that
in period 2, the migrant returns to the origin country if
Dw < DR + Ds,
where
Dw ≡ whph −
wo
po
,
DR (r) ≡ Ro (r)po −
Rh (r)
ph
,
Ds (s) ≡ τ spo −
τ s
ph
> 0.
While returns to remittances and wages were already location-specific with po = ph,
they differ even more with different prices. Furthermore, returns to savings also become
location-specific through differences in prices. In period 1, the probability of return
migration becomes Pr (Dw ≤ DR + Ds) = F (DR + Ds). This probability increases with
both remittances and savings:
∂F (DR + Ds)
∂r = f (DR + Ds)D
′
R (r) = f (DR + Ds)
(R′o (r)
po
− R
′
h (r)
ph
)
> 0,
∂F (DR + Ds)
∂s = f (DR + Ds)D
′
s = f (DR + Ds) τ
( 1
po
− 1ph
)
> 0.
It is worth noting that D′R (r) > D′s, and as a result that remittances increase the
likelihood of return migration more than savings, under the sufficient condition that
R′o (r) ≥ τ .22 Apart from the differences in consumption levels induced by purchasing
powers, themigrant’s utility is unchanged. The certainty equivalent functional of period-2
consumption c˜2 is therefore
E
[
g (c2)
]=F (DR+Ds)E( g(co) |Dw≤DR+Ds)+(1−F (DR+Ds))E ( g(ch) |Dw>DR+Ds).
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Using a linear g(·) function, the risk-neutral migrant’s utility is now:
U = u (c1) + δu
(
E
[
τ s
p
]
+ E
[R
p
]
+ E
[w
p
])
,
where
E
[
τ s
p
]
= F(DR + Ds) τ spo + (1 − F(DR + Ds))
τ s
ph
,
E
[R
p
]
≡ F (DR + Ds) Ropo + (1 − F(DR + Ds))
Rh
ph
,
E
[w
p
]
≡
DR+Ds∫
−∞
E
(wo
po
|Dw
)
f (Dw) dDw +
+∞∫
DR+Ds
E
(wh
ph
|Dw
)
f (Dw) dDw.
The expression in E
[
τ s
p
]
highlights the fact that since returns to savings also become
location-specific through differences in prices, their return is, just like wages and remit-
tances, also random ex ante. The next proposition describes the properties of returns to
remittances and savings when purchasing powers differ across locations.
Proposition 8. The remittance and saving technologies with different purchasing powers
• Expected returns to remittances are positive and potentially convex:
∂E [c2]
∂r = E
[R′ (r)
p
]
≡ F (DR + Ds) R
′
o (r)
po
+ (1 − F (DR + Ds))
R′h (r)
ph
,
∂2E [c2]
∂r2 = E
[R′′ (r)
p
]
+ f (DR + Ds)
(
D′R (r)
)2 ,
where
E
[R′′ (r)
p
]
≡ F (DR + Ds) R
′′
o
po
+ (1 − F (DR + Ds))
R′′h
ph
.
• Expected returns to savings are positive and always convex:
∂E [c2]
∂s = E
[
τ
p
]
≡ F (DR + Ds) τpo + (1 − F (DR + Ds))
τ
ph
,
∂2E [c2]
∂s2 = f (DR + Ds)
(
D′s (s)
)2
> 0.
• Returns to remittances (savings) increase with savings (remittances):
∂2E [c2]
∂r∂s = f (DR + Ds)D
′
RD′s > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
Two things are worth mentioning here. First, both savings and remittances increase the
likelihood of return. As a result, they both have a positive return and positively affect
the return of the other technology. One can see that returns to remittances compare to
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returns to savings in the following way:
∂E [c2]
∂r 
∂E [c2]
∂s ⇐⇒
F(DR) 1po
F(DR) 1po + (1 − F(DR)) 1ph
R′o (r)
+
(1 − F(DR)) 1ph
F(DR) 1po + (1 − F(DR)) 1ph
R′h (r)  τ .
One can see that, as in the basic model, returns to savings τ must be compared to a
weighted sum of R′o (r) and R′h (r), where the weights not only depend on the probability
of return migration, but also on relative prices. If prices are equal, one obtains the same
condition as before.
Second, while returns to remittances may be convex as in the basic setting, returns to
savings are now always convex. This is due to the fact that, while the unadjusted (for dif-
ferences in purchasing power) return to savings is linear, increasing savings creates an
incentive to return and enjoy a higher purchasing power. The more the migrant saves, the
more he/she increases this incentive as the likelihood of return migration keeps increas-
ing. Making use of the concept of wage prospects from migration, one can conclude that
migrants with lower wage prospects (higher F (Dw) for any given Dw) face higher returns
to both remittances and savings.
Let us now determine the migrant’s portfolio efficiency frontier. This frontier deter-
mines, for a given amount x invested in period 1, the optimal mix of savings and
remittances (r, s) (i.e. such that r + s = x) which maximizes E [c2|r, s]. This question
is not trivial, given that as we have just seen, the two technologies are complemen-
tary
(
∂2E[c2]
∂r∂s > 0
)
, but savings (and also potentially remittances) have convex returns
individually.
Lemma 6. Consider a migrant who invests an amount x into a remittance/saving port-
folio (r, s), such that r + s = x. The portfolio (r, s) which maximizes is E [c2|r, s] is at a
corner solution (i.e. either (0, x) or (x, 0)) if and only if
∂2E [c2]
∂r2 +
∂2E [c2]
∂s2 − 2
∂2E [c2]
∂r∂s ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
E
[R′′ (r)
p
]
+ f (DR + Ds)
(
D′R − D′s
)2 ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.2.
In the basic setting, it has been shown in Proposition 2 that the migrant’s problem
admitted a corner solution if returns to remittances were convex: ∂2E[c2]
∂r2 ≥ 0. In the set-
ting with different purchasing powers across locations, this condition is more complex for
two reasons. First, it also involves returns to savings, which are here convex
(
∂2E[c2]
∂s2 > 0
)
.
While this term was equal to zero in the basic setting since returns to savings were certain
and linear, its presence here reinforces the case for corner solutions. Second, the con-
dition also involves the complementarity between both technologies
(
∂2E[c2]
∂r∂s > 0
)
. This
complementarity clearly goes in favor of an interior solution, whereas in the basic setting,
both technologies didn’t interact.
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When all these terms are combined, they simplify to an expression which is very sim-
ilar and qualitatively equivalent to the basic setting. Indeed, Proposition 4 shows (under
identical prices between locations) that returns to remittances are convex if the concav-
ity in expected returns to remittances
(
E
[
R′′(r)
p
])
does not counterbalance the increase
in marginal returns to remittances induced by the feedback effect
(
f (DR + Ds)
(
D′R
)2).
Interestingly, in this more complex setting, the condition under which corner solutions
prevail is identical, with the exception that the source of convexity induced by the feed-
back effect must also incorporate the gap in returns to savings: f (DR + Ds)
(
D′R − D′s
)2.
The reason thereof is fairly intuitive. Indeed, in the basic setting, an additional mone-
tary unit invested in remittances (and removed from savings so that the amount invested
remains constant since s = x− r) used to increase the gap in consumption in favor of the
origin country by D′R. The fact that savings decreased by one unit did not affect the gap
across locations (co − ch) since this unit of savings would have brought τ in period 2 inde-
pendently of the location choice. When prices differ however, this is no longer the case:
savings also create a gap in consumption. Reducing savings at the margin now decreases
the gap across locations by D′s. The net effect of substituting one unit from remittances
for savings on the gap between co and ch is therefore D′R − D′s.
One might therefore be tempted to conclude that the introduction of differences in pur-
chasing power limits the scope for corner solutions, since the source of convexity is now
mitigated by the fact that savings reduce the consumption gap across locations through
D′s. It is worth reminding, however, that the introduction of prices also amplifies D′R by
the same effect (lower prices in the origin country reinforce the benefits of remittances
in case of return). Summing up, one can conclude that the condition under which corner
solutions prevails is qualitatively equivalent to the basic setting.
We have established in the previous lemma the condition under which, for a given
amount x invested, the efficient portfolio is diversified or not. As in the main setting, let
us now describe in more detail the way the composition of this efficient portfolio evolves
with migration prospects. Again, we will distinguish two cases. We will refer to the “con-
cave case” as the case where E
[
R′′(r)
p
]
+ f (DR + Ds)
(
D′R − D′s
)2
< 0, which potentially
leads to interior solutions in r and s, and to the convex case when this expression is
positive, leading systematically to corner solutions.
Let us now analyze the optimal portfolio composition for these different types of
migrants. Proposition 9 shows that this composition follows exactly the same pattern as
in the basic setting, both in the concave and convex cases.
Proposition 9. Optimal portfolio under risk neutrality and different purchasing powers
1. In the concave case,
• migrants with “high” prospects only save: (0, s∗),
• migrants with “intermediate” both save and remit: (r∗, s∗) such that
E
[
τ
p
]
= E
[
R′(r)
p
]
,
• migrants with “low” prospects only remit: (r∗, 0).
2. In the convex case,
• migrants with “high” prospects only save: (0, s∗)
• migrants with “low” and “intermediate” prospects only remit: (r∗, 0).
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Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
Finally, let us analyze the impact of remittances and savings in the case of risk averse
migrants when prices differ across locations. Adapting previous results, one can show
that the impacts of remittances and savings on consumption variance are respectively
∂Var(c2)
∂r = 2D
′
RF (DR+Ds) (1−F (DR+Ds)) [E(co|Dw ≤ DR+Ds)−E(ch|Dw>DR+Ds)] ,
∂Var(c2)
∂s = 2D
′
sF (DR+Ds) (1−F (DR+Ds)) [E(co|Dw≤DR+Ds)−E(ch|Dw > DR + Ds)] .
Therefore, we can conclude the following.
Proposition 10. The impact of remittances and savings on risk with different purchasing
powers
• Remittances and savings both decrease (increase) consumption variance if the wage
risk is mostly located in the host (origin) country:
∂Var(c2)
∂r < 0 and
∂Var(c2)
∂s < 0 ⇐⇒ θh > θ˜h.
• Remittances affect consumption variance more than savings if remittances imply a
larger consumption gap than savings:∣∣∣∣∂Var(c2)∂r
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂Var(c2)∂s
∣∣∣∣ ⇐⇒ D′R > D′s.
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
As we have seen above, the condition under which D′R is larger than D′s is very weak. It
indeed suffices (but is not even necessary) that R′o (r) is larger than τ . We can therefore
conclude that risk averse migrants facing high wage uncertainty in the host country tend
to remit rather than save for a precautionary motive, confirming the result stated in the
main setting.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a theory of migrants’ decisions on their remittance-saving
portfolio under uncertainty about labor market performance in the host country and
endogenous return migration. Stylized facts show that migrants have poor information
about their professional prospects at the time of arrival in the host country. In our model,
beliefs about such prospects affect migrants’ remittance and saving decisions at the early
stage of migration, and will in turn shape the likelihood of return migration in the future.
The model provides insights about the role played by such migrant characteristics on
portfolio decisions. Two key results are obtained.
First, the higher the migration prospects (i.e. expected wage gain from migration),
the lower the incentive to remit and the higher the incentive to save. This result
stems from the fact that ceteris paribus, migrants with high migration prospects are
less likely to return to their origin country. As a result, migrants anticipate that
they will only partly enjoy the benefits of the investments financed by their remit-
tances in the country of origin (housing, businesses, social capital,...). Therefore,
they tend to remit less and to favor savings ex ante. Second, migrants who face a
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relatively large wage risk in the host country are more likely to remit: remitting allows
them to balance future risks across locations as it increases the likelihood of return
migration.
Combining these prospect and risk characteristics, the model predicts that low-skill,
illegal migrants are likely to remit, whereas highly-educated and documented migrants
are less likely to remit. Intermediate remitters are for instance legal migrants with low
levels of education, and student migrants, whose returns from migration are potentially
high but risky.
These results provide insights to explain the massive flows of low-skill, illegal migrants
towards more developed countries. Indeed, it is in the own interest of such migrants to
send remittances, independently of pressure mechanisms, such as migrant networks, or
altruistic behavior. Therefore, relatives of these migrants anticipate that they are likely to
receive remittances if they invest in them by fostering migration, even if their supervision
mechanisms are limited.
The model also reproduces other stylized facts. For instance, the diversification of
migrants’ portfolios depends on the remittance technology, and more precisely on
whether returns to remittances are concave or convex. When remittances have convex
returns, migrants either save or remit, but do not invest in both assets. This result con-
tributes to explanation of the large share of non-remitting migrants. Also, the model can
explain potential cases of negative selection of return migrants.
While the basic version of the model assumes for expositional simplicity that prices are
the same in both locations, an extension of the model allows for differences in purchasing
power between host and origin countries. This introduction substantially complicates the
analysis but leads to the same qualitative results, the only remarkable difference being
that savings also affect return migration since they allow to enjoy a higher consumption
in case of return migration. However, this difference also applies to remittances, so that
portfolio decisions of migrants follow the same pattern as in the basic setting, based on
wage prospects and risk location.
Endnotes
1Source: Worldbank, Migration and Development Brief #21, 2013.
2Source: Migration and remittances factbook (2011), World Bank.
3See the literature review below.
4The notion of investment in this paper must be interpreted in a very broad sense,
encompassing various forms of capital, including physical, financial, human and social
capital.
5The case of non-EU workers residing in the European Union is a good example of this
type of migration.
6This result is in line with the numerous empirical papers observing that more
educated migrants are less likely to remit.
7Illegal migrants also generally rely more on transnational networks, since such
networks improve migrants’ economic prospects and provide them with informal
insurance. The counterpart of these networks is that they exert a pressure to remit,
which provides an additional reason why origin countries support risky migration.
8In order to keep the exposition as simple as possible, the altruism motive is not
presented in this model. The inclusion of this motive, even though it would clearly
provide an additional incentive to remit, would not qualitatively affect our main results,
which describe the effects of remittances on return plans and on the expectation and the
variance of the migrant’s consumption. Furthermore, as discussed in the review of the
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literature, the altruism motive is difficult to distinguish from a motive of investment in
social capital in the origin country (Stark and Falk 1998)
9Still, we add an extension of the model allowing for differences in purchasing power
for the sake of generality.
10While remittances need not always have an explicit investment purpose, they
generally benefit the migrant by maintaining his/her membership rights, and by
improving his/her social status in the community. In this case, they can therefore also be
considered as a form of investment.
11We do not impose specific assumptions on the shape of Rl (r) and keep it general. It
is likely however that this shape is affected by the relationship between the sender and
the recipient of remittances, and we discuss this point in Section 4.2.
12This is obvious in the case of investments in social capital where Ro (r) = 0. Then,
D′R (r) ≡ R′o (r) > 0. For other types of investments, this only implies that the larger the
investment, the larger the cost to liquidate the asset, for instance in the case of
proportional costs. A more complex framework involving a recipient in an agency
relationship also leads to D′R (r) > 0 (not presented here but available upon
request).
13This basic version, which neglects differences in purchasing powers and country
preferences, already allows us to reproduce many stylized facts about remittances and
return migration plans. The impact of such differences will be discussed further.
14See the introductory section.
15For example, assuming risk neutrality under standard expected utility would impose
the utility function to be linear. In this case, the migrant has no taste for consumption
smoothing either, so that at equilibrium, consumption is always at a corner in one of the
two periods.
16The models of Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Selden (1978) are equivalent but we use
the formulation of Kreps and Porteus which is more intuitive. See Chapter 20 of Gollier
(2004) for an introduction to non-expected utility.
17Note that by definition,
+∞∫
−∞
m(wo,Dw)dwo =
+∞∫
−∞
n(wh,Dw)dwh = f (Dw).
18As mentioned in the introduction, there is mixed evidence about the economic
success of returnees. Despite the existence of a migration premium derived from the
human capital accumulated in the host country, some analyses, such as Coulon and
Piracha (2005) and Campos-Vazquez and Lara (2012), find a negative selection of return
migrants: had they never migrated, the counterfactual wages of return migrants are
lower than non-migrants.
19The zero probability of return migration in the absence of remittances requires the
absence of a common support between the distributions of wo and wh. This example is
based on this assumption for simplicity of exposition, but none of our results rely on it.
20The migrant therefore modifies his/her consumption path over time, conceding a
lower consumption level in period 1 in order to enjoy a higher expected consumption
level in period 2.
21While wages for a given individual are independently distributed across locations,
this assumption is compatible with the fact that the distribution parameters between the
two locations are correlated accross individuals. For instance, highly educated agents
probably face high expected wage in both locations, while low-educated migrants are
likely to face low expected wages in both origin and host countries.
22Indeed, D′R (r) > D′s if and only if
R′o(r)
τ
>
1
po − 1ph
1
po − 1ph
R′h(r)
R′o(r)
< 1.
23To see this, note that under normality, we have that E (wo|Dw) = σ
2
h
σ 2o +σ 2h
μo +
σ 2o
σ 2o +σ 2h
(μh − Dw) and E (wh|Dw) = σ
2
h
σ 2o +σ 2h
(μo + Dw) + σ
2
o
σ 2o +σ 2h
μh.
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24Note that since wages are the only source of uncertainty,
Var (co|Dw ≤ DR) = Var (wo|Dw ≤ DR) ,
Var (ch|Dw > DR) = Var (wh|Dw > DR) .
25Those calculations make use of the following relationships:
Var (wl|DR) = E
(
w2l |DR
)− E (wl|DR)2 ,
E (wh|DR) − E (wo|DR) = E (wh − wo|DR) = DR.
and are available upon request.
26The fact that F1 is smaller than F2 is true for the concave and convex cases, except in
the extreme subcase where R′′h > 0 and D′′R > 0. Then, F1 would be larger than F2.
27One could simplify the exposition further by assuming that Ro (0) = Rh (0) =
DR (0) = 0, in which case this gap would be simply Ds (x).
28Applying the implicit function theorem to ∂E[c2|r
∗,x−r∗]
∂r − ∂E[c2|r
∗,x−r∗]
∂s = 0, one
obtains that
dr∗
dx =
∂2E[c2|(r,x−r)]
∂r∂x
− ∂2E[c2|(r,x−r)]
∂r2
,
where the denomitor is positive in the concave case, and the numerator is developed
below.
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
First, recall that
E(wo|Dw ≤ DR) =
DR∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
wo
m(wo,Dw)
F (DR)
dwodDw = 1F (DR)
DR∫
−∞
E(wo|Dw)f (Dw) dDw.
Applying Leibniz’s rule, and keeping in mind that the only object which depends on r is
DR,
∂E(wo|Dw ≤ DR)
∂r = D
′
R
⎡⎣ f (DR)
F (DR)
E(wo|DR) − f (DR)F (DR)2
DR∫
−∞
E(wo|Dw)f (Dw) dDw
⎤⎦
= −D′R
f (DR)
F (DR)
[E(wo|Dw ≤ DR) − E(wo|DR)] ,
= −D′R
f (DR)
F (DR)
[E(wo|wo ≥ wh − DR) − E(wo|wo = wh − DR)] < 0.
(26)
Second, similarly,
E (wh|Dw > DR) =
+∞∫
DR
+∞∫
−∞
wh
n(wh,Dw)
1 − F (DR)dwhdDw
= 11 − F (DR)
+∞∫
DR
+∞∫
−∞
whn (wh|Dw) dwhf (Dw) dDw.
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Hence, applying Leibniz’s rule again,
∂E(wh|Dw>DR)
∂r =D
′
R
⎡⎢⎣− 11−F(DR)E(wo|DR) f(DR)+ f (DR)(1−F(DR))2
+∞∫
DR
E(wo|Dw)f (Dw)dDw
⎤⎥⎦
=D′R
f (DR)
1 − F (DR) [E(wh|wh > DR + wo) − E(wh|wh = DR + wo)] > 0.
(27)
Appendix 2: Illustrating the remittance technology
First, the savings technology only relies on τ , which we pose equal to 1. The remittance
technology primarily relies on Ro (r), which we specify as Ro (r; a, b) = b raa , with a and b
positive, so that Ro (r) is concave if and only if a ≤ 1. Let γ ∈ [0; 1] represent the pro-
portion of Ro spent as transaction costs to repatriate the investment in the host country,
so that Rh (r) = (1 − γ ) b raa and DR (r) = γ b r
a
a . Let period-2 wages and the wage gap be
normally distributed, with
E
⎡⎢⎣ whwo
Dw
⎤⎥⎦ =
⎛⎜⎝μhμo

⎞⎟⎠ and Var
⎡⎢⎣ whwo
Dw
⎤⎥⎦ =
⎛⎜⎝ σ
2
h 0 σ 2h
0 σ 2o −σ 2o
σ 2h −σ 2o σ 2
⎞⎟⎠ ,
where  = E [Dw] = μh − μo and σ 2 = Var (Dw) = σ 2h + σ 2o . Under these assumptions,
after some computations,23 one can show that the expected wage (9) can be rewritten as
E (w) = μh −
DR∫
−∞
Dwf (Dw) dDw,
where the density function f (Dw) depends on  and σ 2. The parameter μh only serves
as a scaling parameter, giving a relevant range for , r and s. We will pose μh =
100. Summing up, the remittance technology relies on the following set of param-
eters: (, σ , a, b, γ ). Figure 6 shows the impact of remittances on E (R (r)) =
F (DR)Ro + (1 − F (DR))Rh, focusing on the case of concave returns to remittances, with
(, σ , a, b, γ ) = (30, 10, 0.6, 4, 0.5). In this example, returns to remittances in the ori-
gin country (the upper shaded curve) dominate returns to savings (the continuous green
line), until r reaches very large values. Returns to savings dominate returns to remittances
in the host country (the lower shaded curve) for r larger than 20. However, it is more
interesting to compare τ s, the green line, to E [R], the continuous black curve. When r
is low, so is DR and therefore the likelihood of return migration F (DR). As a result, for
r < 20, F (DR) = 0 and E [R] = Rh: expected returns are simply returns to remittances
in case of permanent migration. As r increases, F (DR) becomes strictly positive, and the
blue curve representing E [R] separates from Rh and tends to Ro. When r reaches about
70, F (DR) = 1, that is, return migration is certain, and E [R] = Ro. One can see in the
example that expected returns to remittances tend to dominate returns to savings for all
relevant values of remittances. There is, however, an additional point to take into account:
since remittances affect returnmigration, and wages differ between both locations, remit-
tances negatively affect future expected wages. Combining E [R] and E [w], Figure 7 shows
the total impact of remittances on E [c2]. The red curve represents expected wage con-
ditional on optimal location decisions, E [w]. As for E [R], one can see that for very low
Delpierre and Verheyden IZA Journal of Migration 2014, 3:22 Page 31 of 43
http://www.izajom.com/content/3/1/22
Figure 6 Remittances and savings.
values of r, the likelihood of return migration, F (DR), is close to zero, so that E [w] is close
to μh = 100. As r increases, so does the probability of return migration, until F (DR) = 1
(for about r = 100 in this example).
Comparative statics
We explained that prior beliefs about labor market performance had an important impact
on returns to remittances. Figure 8 illustrates this point, keeping the same parameter val-
ues, except for, which equals 40, 20 and 10 in the black, red and blue curves, respectively
(the green line represents returns to savings):
The same exercise is performed for the shape of returns to remittances Rl (r) . Figure 9
compares the concave case presented so far to the linear case (the black curve, with
(a, b) = (1, 2)) and the convex case (the red curve, with (a, b) = (1.4, 0.8)).
Figure 7 Effects of remittances and savings on future expected consumption.
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Figure 8 Comparative statics: migration prospects.
Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 4
Let us prove by contradiction that convex returns lead the migrant to either save or remit,
but not to do both. For the double interior solution to be a maximum, the Hessian of
U has to be definite negative, which requires that the determinant of H be positive. The
Hessian writes
H =
[
Uss Usr
Urs Urr
]
,
where
Uss = u′′1 + δu′′2τ 2 < 0,
Usr = Urs = u′′1 + δu′′2τ
∂E [c2]
∂r < 0,
Urr = u′′1 + δu′′2
(
∂E [c2]
∂r
)2
+ δu′2
∂2E [c2]
∂r2 .
Figure 9 Comparative statics: concave, linear and convex returns R(r).
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By the arbitrage condition (16),
Uss = Usr = Urs ≡  < 0,
Urr =  + δu′2
∂2E [c2]
∂r2 ,
The determinant of the Hessian is positive if and only if
UssUrr − UsrUrs = 
(
 + δu′2
∂2E [c2]
∂r2
)
− 2 = δu′2
∂2E [c2]
∂r2
> 0 ⇐⇒ ∂
2E [c2]
∂r2 < 0.
Therefore, we have just shown that if ∂2E[c2]
∂r2 > 0, then the double interior solution is not
a maximum.We then need to identify which type of corner solution prevails. Two options
must be considered. The first and most obvious case is the corner solution in savings. If
sufficient amounts are spent on remittances, their return eventually dominate the return
to savings, leading to s = 0. This does not imply however that the migrant remits an
infinite amount of money since he/she is prevented from borrowing. In fact, an interior
solution in remittances is still feasible. Since s = 0, the conditions for having a maximum
interior in remittances are the first and second order conditions solely on r:
Ur = −u′1 + δu′2
∂E [c2]
∂r = 0,
Urr = u′′1 + δu′′2
(
∂E [c2]
∂r
)2
+ δu′2
∂2E [c2]
∂r2 ≤ 0.
The latter condition might be fulfilled even if ∂2E[c2]
∂r2 > 0. Indeed, the more the migrant
remits, the more his/her consumption path is distorted at the expense of first period
utility. This cost is convex, while the benefit in terms of second period consumption is
concave. The second case occurs if, due to liquidity constraints, the migrant is unable to
spend enough remittances so as to raise their return to the level of the return to savings,
τ . Then, remittances are at a corner and the migrant saves instead.
Appendix 4: Proof of Lemma 5
First, let us rewrite the total variance as
Var [c2] = o + h + oh, (28)
where
o = F (DR)Var(co|Dw ≤ DR),
h = (1 − F (DR))Var (ch|Dw > DR) ,
oh = F (DR) (1 − F(DR)) [E (co|Dw ≤ DR) − E (ch|Dw > DR)]2
= F (DR) (1 − F(DR)) [DR + E (wo|Dw ≤ DR) − E (wh|Dw > DR)]2 .
Based this expression, one can write the effect of r on Var [c2] as the sum of three
effects.24
We first split the resolution of these three effects in two separate subsections, and then
gather them in third subsection.
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The derivatives ofo andh with respect to r
First, note that
o = F (DR)
DR∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
(wo − E(wo|Dw ≤ DR))2m(wo|Dw)dwo f (Dw)F (DR)dDw,
h = (1 − F (DR))
+∞∫
DR
+∞∫
−∞
(wh − E(wh|Dw > DR))2 n(wh|Dw)dwh f (Dw)1 − F (DR)dDw.
Applying Leibniz’s rule,
∂o
∂r = D
′
Rf (DR)
+∞∫
−∞
(wo − E(wo|Dw ≤ DR))2m(wo|DR)dwo
−2
DR∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
∂E(wo|Dw ≤ DR)
∂r (wo − E(wo|Dw ≤ DR))m(wo|Dw)dwof (Dw) dDw.
Note that, as seen in the previous appendix, ∂E(wo|Dw≤DR)
∂r does not depend neither on
wo nor on Dw, and can therefore exit from the integrals of the second term. One can then
rewrite
∂o
∂r = D
′
Rf (DR)
+∞∫
−∞
(wo − E(wo|Dw ≤ DR))2m(wo|DR)dwo
−2∂E(wo|Dw ≤ DR)
∂r
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
DR∫
−∞
+∞∫
−∞
(wo − E(wo|Dw ≤ DR))m(wo|Dw)dwof (Dw) dDw.
By a similar reasoning,
∂h
∂r = −D
′
Rf (DR)
+∞∫
−∞
(wh − E(wh|Dw > DR))2 n(wh|DR)dwh
−2∂E(wh|Dw > DR)
∂r
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
+∞∫
DR
+∞∫
−∞
(wh − E(wh|Dw > DR)) n(wh|Dw)dwhf (Dw) dDw.
Summing up,
∂o
∂r = D
′
Rf (DR)
+∞∫
−∞
(wo − E(wo|Dw ≤ DR))2m(wo|DR)dwo
= D′Rf (DR)
{
E
[
w2o|DR
]+ E(wo|Dw ≤ DR)2 − 2E(wo|Dw ≤ DR)E [wo|DR]} ,
∂h
∂r = −D
′
Rf (DR)
+∞∫
−∞
(wh − E(wh|Dw > DR))2 n(wh|DR)dwh
= −D′Rf (DR)
{
E
[
w2h|DR
]+ E (wh|Dw > DR)2 − 2E(wh|Dw > DR)E [wh|DR]} .
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The derivative ofoh with respect to r
The derivative of the third term (oh) with respect to remittances is given by
∂oh
∂r = D
′
Rf (DR) (1 − 2F(DR)) [DR + E (wo|Dw ≤ DR) − E (wh|Dw > DR)]2
+2F (DR) (1 − F(DR))
[
[DR + E (wo|Dw ≤ DR) − E (wh|Dw > DR)]
∗
[
D′R + ∂E(wo|Dw≤DR)∂r − ∂E(wh|Dw>DR)∂r
] ] ,
where ∂E(wo|Dw≤DR)
∂r and
∂E(wh|Dw>DR)
∂r are determined in (26) and (27).
The derivative ofo + h +oh with respect to r
Combining those terms, the derivative of the total variance is
∂Var [c2]
∂r =
∂o
∂r +
∂h
∂r +
∂oh
∂r .
After tedious calculations, we end up with equation (21).25
Appendix 5: Proof of proposition 5
First, let us show that the normality assumption helps obtain analytical results to our
problem. Indeed, to assess the distribution of the difference of two random variables,
such as Dw = wh − wo, is generally a very demanding task which makes use of concepts
of cross-correlation of distributions and complex conjugate of density functions. Such a
distribution does not have an analytical expression in virtually all types of distribution
functions, except the normal distribution. In other words, assuming a normal distribution
is the unique case which provides an analytical solution to the problem of the determi-
nation of Dw’s distribution. In this case, Dw, which is a linear combination of two normal
random variables, is also normally distributed, with parameters E [Dw] = μh − μo and
Var [Dw] = σ 2h + σ 2o .
Conditional expectation
Second, as we already saw in the previous section, we make extensive use of the concept
of conditional expectation of wages. In general, the conditional expectation E [wo|Dw] is
a complex, usually nonlinear, function of Dw, which depends on the joint distribution of
wo and Dw. In the case of the joint bivariate normal distribution, however, the conditional
expectation is linear in Dw according to the following general formulation:
E [wo|Dw] = E [wo] +
(
corr (wo,Dw)
√
Var [wo]
Var [Dw]
)
(Dw − E [Dw]) .
Let us develop this expression in order to provide more intuition. Since cov (Dw,wo)
=−σ 2o and corr (Dw,wo) = −σ
2
o
σo
√
σ 2o +σ 2h
= − σo√
σ 2o +σ 2h
, we can write:
E [wo|Dw] = μo +
⎛⎜⎝− σo√
σ 2o + σ 2h
σo√
σ 2o + σ 2h
⎞⎟⎠ (Dw − (μh − μo))
= μo − σ
2
o
σ 2o + σ 2h
(Dw − (μh − μo))
= σ
2
h
σ 2o + σ 2h
μo +
(
1 − σ
2
h
σ 2o + σ 2h
)
μh −
(
1 − σ
2
h
σ 2o + σ 2h
)
Dw.
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Let θh = σ
2
h
σ 2o +σ 2h
and μ¯ = θhμo + (1 − θh) μh. We can finally rewrite E [wo|Dw] (and
following the same reasoning E [wh|Dw]) as
E [wo|Dw] = μ¯ − (1 − θh)Dw,
E [wh|Dw] = μ¯ + θhDw.
Conditional variance
The conditional variance under normality is based on the following general formula:
Var [wh|Dw] = σ 2h
(
1 − cor (wh,Dw)2
)
.
Substituting, one can show that conditional variances of wh and wo are equal:
Var [wh|Dw] = Var [wo|Dw] =
σ 2hσ
2
o
σ 2o + σ 2h
.
The effect of remittances on consumption variance
Combining the expressions of conditional expectation and variance with Lemma 5, the
second term of (21) vanishes. The effect of remittances on consumption variance boils
down to
∂Var(c2)
∂r = 2D
′
RF (DR) (1 − F (DR)) [E(co|Dw ≤ DR) − E(ch|Dw > DR)] ,
where, based on the conditional expectation formula, it is straightforward to show that
conditional expectations with inequality are:
E [wo|Dw ≤ DR] = μ − (1 − θh)E [Dw|Dw ≤ DR]
E [wh|Dw > DR] = μ + θhE [Dw|Dw > DR] .
Therefore, E(co|Dw ≤ DR) − E(ch|Dw > DR) can be rewritten as
θh (E [Dw|Dw ≤ DR] − E [Dw|Dw > DR]) + DR (r) − E [Dw|Dw ≤ DR] ,
so that ∂Var(c2)
∂r < 0 if and only if
DR (r) − E [Dw|Dw ≤ DR] < θh [E [Dw|Dw > DR] − E [Dw|Dw ≤ DR]]
⇐⇒ θh > θ˜h (r) .
Appendix 6: Proof of Proposition 6
First, recall that
θ˜h (r) ≡ DR − E [Dw|Dw ≤ DR]E [Dw|Dw > DR] − E [Dw|Dw ≤ DR] .
If wages are jointly normally distributed, the following relationships hold:
E [Dw|Dw ≤ DR] = μD − σD
φ
(
DR−μD
σD
)

(
DR−μD
σD
) ,
E [Dw|Dw > DR] = μD + σD
φ
(
DR−μD
σD
)
1 − 
(
DR−μD
σD
) ,
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where μD = E [Dw] = μh − μo; σD =
√
Var [Dw] =
√
σ 2h + σ 2o and where φ (.) and

(
DR−E[Dw]
σD
)
are the marginal and cumulative density functions of a standardized
normal distribution, respectively. It follows that θ˜h (r) can be rewritten as
θ˜h = q (Z) = (1 − (Z))
(
1 + Z(Z)
φ (Z)
)
,
where Z = DR−μD
σD
and q (·) is a transformation of standard normal -marginal and
cumulative- density functions and, importantly, does not depend on any parameter of the
model. This last fact implies that
θ˜h
′
(r) = q′ (Z) ∂Z
∂r = q
′ (Z) D
′
R
σD
> 0,
since q′ (Z) > 0. Indeed, this transformation of the standard normal distribution is
increasing in Z, as displayed in Figure 10:
Appendix 7: Example 1
We can derive from the example that
E (wa) = E (wb) = w
Var (wa) = (1 − θh)2 Var (x)
Var (wb) = θ2hVar (x) .
Ex ante, taking into account the optimal location choice, the agent’s income is given by
a random variable with the following definition
ω ≡ Max {wa,wb}
=
⎧⎨⎩ w − (1 − θh) x, if x < 0w + θhx, otherwise.
Figure 10 q(Z).
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Let us first mention that, in such a setting, the ability to choose a location after the risk is
revealed allows the agent to earn a higher income, on average, than if she was locked in
one of the two locations. Indeed,
E (ω) =
0∫
−∞
[w − (1 − θh) x] dF (x) +
+∞∫
0
(w + θhx) dF (x)
= w − F(0)E(x | x < 0)
> w.
This result obviously applies to the more general framework of this paper. Second, let
us discuss the impact of the initial risk composition θh on the agent’s aggregate risk. To
this end, we calculate the variance of the agent’s income:
Var (ω) =
0∫
−∞
(1 − θh)2 x2dF (x) +
+∞∫
0
θ2hx2dF (x) −
⎡⎣ 0∫
−∞
xdF (x)
⎤⎦2 .
Note that the third term does not depend on θh. Hence, Var (ω) is minimized for
θ∗h =
0∫
−∞
x2dF (x)
⎡⎣+∞∫
−∞
x2dF (x)
⎤⎦−1 ∈ [0, 1] .
which, under the sufficient condition that the distribution of x is symmetric, implies that
θ∗h = 1/2.
Appendix 8: Proofs of the extension with different purchasing powers
Appendix 8.1: Proof of Proposition 8
Returns to remittances can be decomposed as:
∂E
[
τ s
p
]
∂r = f (DR + Ds)
(
τ s
po
− τ sph
)
D′r = f (DR + Ds)DsD′R > 0,
∂E
[
R
p
]
∂r = f (DR + Ds)
(Ro
po
− Rhph
)
D′R + E
[R′ (r)
p
]
= f (DR + Ds)DRD′R + E
[R′ (r)
p
]
,
∂E
[
w
p
]
∂r = E
(wo
po
|DR + Ds
)
f (DR + Ds)D′R − E
(wh
ph
|DR + Ds
)
f (DR + Ds)D′R
= − (DR + Ds) f (DR + Ds)D′R.
Summing these three terms, one obtains the result after simplifications. Similarly for
returns to savings,
∂E
[
τ s
p
]
∂s = f (DR + Ds)
(
τ s
po
− τ sph
)
D′s + E
[
τ
p
]
= f (DR + Ds)DsD′s + E
[
τ
p
]
> 0,
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∂E
[
R
p
]
∂s = f (DR + Ds)
(Ro
po
− Rhph
)
D′s = f (DR + Ds)DRD′s,
∂E
[
w
p
]
∂s = E
(wo
po
|DR + Ds
)
f (DR + Ds)D′s − E
(wh
ph
|DR + Ds
)
f (DR + Ds)D′s
= − (DR + Ds) f (DR + Ds)D′s.
Appendix 8.2: Proof of Lemma 6
To show this, let analyze, for a given amount invested x, the portfolio (r, s) such that
r + s = x which maximizes E [c2] . This boils down to find the level of r which maximizes
E [c2|r, x − r]. If E [c2|r, x − r] is convex in r, then r will always be at a corner solution,
i.e. the migrant will either remit or save, but not do both simultaneously. Let us there-
fore study the second derivative of E [c2|r, x − r] with respect to r and show under which
condition it is positive. The first derivative is, using Proposition 8:
∂E [c2| (r, x − r)]
∂r =
∂E [c2|r, s]
∂r +
∂E [c2|r, s]
∂s
∂ (x − r)
∂r =
∂E [c2|r, s]
∂r −
∂E [c2|r, s]
∂s
= F (DR + Ds)
(R′o
po
− τpo
)
+ (1 − F (DR + Ds))
(R′h
ph
− τph
)
.
Therefore,
∂2E [c2|r, x − r]
∂r2 =
∂2E [c2|r, s]
∂r2 −
∂2E [c2|r, s]
∂r∂s −
∂E [c2|r, s]
∂s∂r +
∂2E [c2|r, s]
∂s
= ∂
2E [c2|r, s]
∂r2 +
∂2E [c2|r, s]
∂s − 2
∂2E [c2|r, s]
∂r∂s .
Making use of Proposition 8, one obtains after simplifications the equivalent condition
stated in the Lemma.
Appendix 8.3: Proof of Proposition 9
Let us start by formally defining wage prospects. In order to do so, let us define two
thresholds, F2 and F1:
F1 ≡
τ
ph −
R′h(0)
ph
D′R (0) − D′s
, with 1 > F1 > 0,
F2 ≡
τ
ph −
R′h(x)
ph
D′R (x) − D′s
, with 1 > F2 > F1.
These thresholds allow us to formally order migrants in terms of wage prospects, fol-
lowing the first order stochastic dominance concept presented in Section 4.2.26 Let us
consider again a migrant who intends to invest an amount x. The consumption gap that
this investment induces between the origin country and the host country depends on the
way x is spent, between remittances and savings:DR (r)+Ds (x − r). For the reasons moti-
vated above, as soon as D′R > D′s, this gap is the largest when all the money is invested in
remittances, in which case it is equal to DR (x). We will say that a migrant has “low” wage
prospects if it is too likely that he/she will have a wage gap below this highest value. By
too likely, we mean that the probability that Dw is lower than DR (x) is larger than F2, the
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largest of the two newly introduced thresholds. Summing up, the migrant is said to have
“low” wage prospects if and only if F (DR (x)) > F2.
On the other hand, the gap DR (r) +Ds (x − r) is the smallest for r = 0, in which case it
is equal toDR (0)+Ds (x).27 Amigrant is said to have “high” wage prospects if he/she faces
a sufficiently small probability of facing a wage gap below this value. By sufficiently small
probability, we mean in this case the smaller threshold F1. This means that the migrant is
said to have “high” wage prospects if F (DR (0) + Ds (x)) < F1.
We can now analyze the migrant’s optimal portfolio decisions, starting with the con-
cave case. When x is small, due to the concavity of R, investing in remittances yields
higher marginal returns in case of return migration than savings: for r sufficiently close
to zero, R′o (r) is larger than τ . If R′h (x) is also larger than τ , then the problem is triv-
ially solved, as in this case, the migrant remits x and saves 0 since remittances dominate
savings independently of the migrant’s future location. The interesting and relevant case
is when R′h (x) < τ , because the arbitrage between savings and remittances depends on
the probability of return migration. This implies, as in the basic setting (Lemma 4), that
migrants with higher wage prospects (lower F (Dw) for any givenDw) have higher returns
to remittances. As in Proposition 3, high-prospect migrants only save. Formally, this will
be the case if ∂E[c2|0,x]
∂r <
∂E[c2|0,x]
∂s , or equivalently stated in terms of migration prospects:
(r, s) = (0, x) ⇐⇒ F (DR (0) + Ds (x)) < F1,
where F1 ≡
τ
ph
− R
′
h(0)
ph
D′R(0)−D′s ∈ ]0; 1[. In other words, as it is straightforward to check using
Proposition 8, the definition of “high” wage prospects implies that ∂E[c2|0,x]
∂r <
∂E[c2|0,x]
∂s .
For migrants with intermediate wage prospects, this condition is not fulfilled, which
implies that focusing exclusively on saving is not efficient. Indeed, when return migra-
tion becomes too likely, the advantage of remitting (R′o > τ ) becomes sufficiently relevant
to marginally substitute remittances for savings. This substitution leads to an interior
solution (r, x − r) with r > 0 such that ∂E[c2|r,x−r]
∂r = ∂E[c2r,x−r]∂s . It must be noted that
as x increases, so does r∗ as long as the complementary effect induced by combining
remittances and savings dominates the loss of marginal returns to savings (due to its
convexity)28:
∂2E [c2|r, x − r]
∂r∂x =
∂2E [c2]
∂r∂s −
∂2E [c2]
∂s2 = f (DR + Ds)D
′
s
(
D′R − D′s
)
> 0.
Interestingly, if an interior solution exists, this condition is always fulfilled, since the
existence of an interior solution implies that R′o > τ > R′h, which itself implies that
D′R > D′s. We can therefore conclude that when the migrant’s portfolio is diversified, the
more the migrant wishes to invest for period 2, the more he/she remits.
Finally, if migrants have low wage prospects, it might be that investing only in remit-
tances is the best option. This will be the case if ∂E[c2|x,0]
∂r >
∂E[c2|x,0]
∂s , or equivalently:
(r, s) = (x, 0) ⇐⇒ F (DR (x) + Ds (0)) > F2,
where F2 ≡
τ
ph
− R
′
h(x)
ph
D′R(x)−D′s , with 1 > F2 > F1.
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Let us now analyze the convex case, in which ∂2E[c2|r,x−r]
∂r2 ≥ 0. First, keep in mind that,
from Lemma 6, the migrant’s portfolio is never diversified here. We need to show here
that
(r, s) = (x, 0) ⇐⇒ F (DR (0) + Ds (x)) > F1.
To see this, note that F (DR (0) + Ds (x)) ≥ Fh is equivalent to ∂E[c2|r,x−r]∂r ≥ 0 for
r = 0. Under this condition, remittances dominate savings when r = 0. Finally, by con-
vexity ( ∂2E[c2|r,x−r]
∂r2 > 0), this first condition implies that
∂E[c2|r,x−r]
∂r ≥ 0 for all r. In other
words, cases where prospects are low (F (DR (x) + Ds (0)) > F2) still lead to (r, s) = (x, 0),
but this is also the case when prospects are intermediate (when the return probability is
between F1 and F2). When prospects are not high (F (DR (0) + Ds (x)) < F1), the optimal
(r, s) is (0, x) for x ≤ x˜, and (x, 0) for x ≥ x˜, where x˜ is such that E [c2 |˜x, 0] = E [c2|0, x˜].
The fact that the optimal (r, s) depends on x is due to the fact that in this case, sav-
ings have a higher return for small x, but a lower return for high x. This is due to two
things. First, in the convex case, R
′
l(x)
pl is lower for small x (than for large x) for any loca-
tion l ∈ {o, h}, whereas returns to savings are constant ( τpl ). Second, when x is small, the
probability of return migration is low, and we know that remittances are most profitable
under return migration. In contrast, returns to remittances dominate savings when x is
large, due to both convexity and the fact that the probability of return migration becomes
larger. Therefore, there exists a threshold x˜ below which full savings (0, x) is the optimal
portfolio, and above which it is in contrast full remittances (x, 0).
Appendix 8.4: Proof of Proposition
This proof relies on previous results. In the proof of Proposition 5, we have shown that
[E(co|Dw ≤ DR + Ds) − E(ch|Dw > DR + Ds)] > 0 ⇐⇒ θh > θ˜h.
This proves the first point of the Proposition. The second point directly follows from
the fact that, independently of the sign of ∂Var(c2)
∂r and
∂Var(c2)
∂s ,
∂Var(c2)
∂r
∂Var(c2)
∂s
= D
′
R
D′s
.
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